Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Ted Sommer, dba Sommer's Auto Wrecking v. Jack
W. Sommer and Wayne Sommer : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gayle Dean Hunt, Steven A. Wuthrich; attorneys for appellee.
Ross R. Kinney; Quarles & Brady; Steven H. Lybbert; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sommer v. Sommer, No. 950210 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6548

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

p^CKfc

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TED SOMMER, dba SOMMER!S AUTO
WRECKING,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

j
]i

Case No. 950210-CA

;
]
i

Priority No. 15

JACK W. SOMMER and WAYNE
SOMMER,
Defendants,
TRANSMISSION TECH INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial Circuit Court
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah
The Honorable Sandra N. Pueler

Ross R. Kinney
Quarles & Brady
411 East Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
(414) 277-5000

Steven A. Wuthrich #6055
Attorney at Law
815 East, 8230 South
Sandy, Utah
84094
(801) 255-2164

Steven H. Lybbert #4187
Suite 302 Felt Bldg.
341 South Main St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-0890

Gayle Dean Hunt #1558
Attorney at Law
50 East, 600 South #250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 355-3636

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

I

I hen* LSS» \K£

JUL 17 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

10

A.

Nature of the Case

10

B.

Course of Prpceedingg

11

C. Undisputed facts in the record as of the cross motions for

summary judgment.
D.

15

Disputed facts found at trial by the Court. . . . . 17

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

. • . . 20

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
23
1.
The Circuit Court did not err in granting a motor vehicle
seller's motion for summary judgment on the issue of a
seller's title retaining lien having priority over a
subsequent mechanic's lien where the mechanic/lienholder
sought to amend its pleading and raise new issues not
factually supported by the record, which motion was heard
concurrent with the summary judgment motions only nine
days prior to trial
23
2.

The Court, as a matter of law, properly ruled at summary
judgment that the title retaining lien of a motor vehicle
seller was valid and had priority despite title having
been placed in the buyer's fathers name, with seller's
lien appearing thereon, where
the issues of
unconscionability and estoppel were first raised only
after the ruling and same do not appear in the
pleadings
35

3.

After granting summary judgment for a motor vehicle
seller on the on cross motions for declaratory judgment
on issue of lien priority vis a vis a
subsequent
repairman's lien, the Court did not err in refusing to
reconsider at a trial on other issues, the previously
granted motion where, in reliance on the order of summary
judgment, the prevailing party was not prepared to
relitigate the issues already decided by the motion.
39
i

4.

The court did not err in denying a motion to amend the
pleading to add additional counterclaims and cross claims
for fraud and conspiracy, where such claims had not been
previously raised in the pleading, where the substantive
facts for the new theories were available from the onset
of the case, the motion was made only one month before
trial, made after the matter was set for trial, and
additional discovery would not have been feasible within
the time remaining for trial
41

5.

The trial court did not err in finding at trial that
purchase contract was entered into on March 13,1991,
agreed upon as to amount to be paid, that it
Defendant Wayne Sommer who reguested title be in
father's name, and in denying defendant's claim
"credits" where no evidence was offered as to
specifics of the alleged credits

the
was
was
his
of
the
42

CONCLUSION

44

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

41

ADDENDUM

42

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurstf 846 P. 2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993) 5,38
Andalex
1994)

Rescourses. Inc, V. Meyers, 871 P. 2d

1041

(Utah App.
21, 25, 37

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)
26
Applied Genetics. Int'l. Inc.r v. First Affiliated Securities.
Inc. , 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.1990)
30
Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n. 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App.),cert.
den. 868 P. 2d 95 (Utah 1993)
31
Automobile Finance Co. v. Mundayr 30 N.E. 2d 1002 (Ohio 1940)
27
Automobile Accept. Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Cr. Corp.r 139 A.2d
683 (Md. App. 1958)
27
Briggs v. Holocomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987)

2, 31

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
25
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

3

Dissault v. Evans f 201 P.2d 822 (Idaho 1953)
Drettmann v. Marchand, 337 Mich. 1, 59 N.W. 2d 56 (1953)

27
. .

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)

28
21

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinsonr 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989)
5
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977)

3

Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Utah 1992)
25
Kelly v. Utah Power 7 Light. 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987) . . 4
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.r 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App.
1993)
4, 36, 37

iii

L & A Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.r 608 P.2d 626 (Utah
1980)
2
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App.
1993)
26
Mastic Tile Div. of Ruberoid Co. v. Acme Distrib. Co., 15 Utah 2d
136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964)
3
Matter of Estate of Justheimf 824 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1991) . 31
Ong Int'l (USA))f
1993)

Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. 850 P. 2d 447 (Utah
29, 31

Onieda/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.r 872 P.2d
1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994)
15
Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co.f 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App.
1991)
31, 32
Philips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983)

29

Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah
2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965)
3
Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1985)
33
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976)
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993)

40
...

15

Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App.
1987)
26
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990) rev'd
on other

grounds,

827 P. 2d 212 (Utah 1992)

35

Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah
1981)
3
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).

. .2

Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
App. 1994)
5
State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Pena. 869 p.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994)

29
5, 38

Tracy v. University of Utah HOSD.. 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980)
iv

39
Utah State Employee's Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 462
P.2d 1,3 (1970)
39
Wade v. Stangel. 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994)
Watkiss v. Foa & Sonr 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)

5
3, 34

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.r 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah
App. 1991)
5
Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch.f 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) . . . . 4

Statutes

U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(d)

1

U.C.A. § 70A-9-317

21

U.C.A. § 70A-9-112

22

U.C.A. § 70A-1-205

23

U.C.A. § 38-2-3

24

U.C.A. § 70A-2-201

29

U.R.A.P. 4

1

U.R.C.P. 15

4

U.R.A.P. 24

5 ,31

U.R.A.P. 11

19

V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake Department, Honorable Sandra N. Pueler presiding,
entered on February 23, 1995, after a summary judgment ruling in
favor of Plaintiff Ted Sommer and against Defendant Transmission
Tech Inc., on the issue of lien priority in and to a dump truck,
which decision was entered December 16, 1994, and after trial on
December 21, 1994 as to the amount of each claimed lien. Appeal was
taken by Defendant Transmission Tech Inc., on March 20, 1995.
Jurisdiction is proper under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(d) and the notice of
appeal is timely filed under Rule 4, U.R.A.P. with respect to
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc.
Defendants Wayne Sommer (truck purchaser and obligor to both
Plaintiff and Defendant Transmission Tech Inc.) and Jack W. Sommer
(titled owner of the truck) have not filed an appeal and the
judgment below is a final and binding judgment as against them. To
the extent that Appellant herein attempts to "bootstrap" Wayne
Sommer into the present action, Appellee objects inasmuch as no
appeal

was

filed

within

the time period

(or subsequently)

permitted by Rule 4, U.R.A.P.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Circuit Court erred in granting a motor vehicle

seller's

motion for summary judgment on the issue of a seller's

title retaining lien having priority over a subsequent repairman's
lien where the repairman/lien claimant sought to amend its pleading

1

and raise new issues not factually supported by the record, which
motion was heard concurrent with the summary judgment motions only
nine days prior to trial? (restatement of issues 1,2 and 7 of
Appellant's brief).
A challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases on summary
judgment do not resolve factual disputes. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).

2.

Whether the Court erred as a matter of law in ruling at

summary judgment that the title retaining lien of a motor vehicle
seller was valid and had priority despite title having been placed
in the buyer's fathers name, with seller's lien appearing thereon,
where issues of unconcionability and estoppel were first raised
after the ruling and do not appear in the pleadings? (Restatement
of issues 6, 7, and 8 of Appellant's brief).
Upon review of a motion of summary judgment, the Supreme Court
applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court.
Briggs v. Holocomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987).However, when a
party pursues a motion for summary judgment on one claim, he may
not,

on appeal, either justify the grant of such motion or

challenge its denial on the basis of a separate and distinct claim.
L & A Prywall Inc. v. Whitmore Coqstr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah
1980). (The present case having been decided on cross motions for
summary judgment on the issue of lien priority).
2

3, Whether, after granting summary judgment for a motor vehicle
seller on the on cross motions for declaratory judgment on issue of
lien priority vis a vis a

subsequent repairman's lien, the Court

erred in refusing to reconsider at a trial on other issues, the
previously granted motion where, in reliance on the order of
summary

judgment, the prevailing

party

was

not prepared

to

relitigate the issues already decided by the motion? (Restatement
of issues 3,5 and 9 of Appellant's brief)
Where the only controversy brought by the parties was the
interpretation of a writing and both parties placed the question in
the hands of the Court by making mutual motions for summary
judgment, the losing party was not entitled to a trial on the facts
after the court made its decision. Mastic Tile Div. of Ruberoid Co,
v. Acme Distrib. Co. f 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). The sole
purpose of summary judgment is to bar from the courts unnecessary
and unjustified litigation. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965).
A "Motion for Reconsideration" may properly be treated as a
Motion for a New Trial. See, e.g. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son,
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah*, 1991). Granting or denying a motion for a new
trial will not be set aside except where there is clear abuse of
the court's discretion. Jensen v. Thomasf 570 P.2d

695 (Utah

1977);Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah
1981). The trial Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a
motion for a new trial. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991).
3

4.

Did the court err in denying a motion to amend the pleading to

add

additional

counterclaims and cross claims for fraud and

conspiracy, where such claims had not been previously raised in the
pleading, where the substantive facts for the new theories were
available from the onset of the case, the motion was made only one
month before trial, made after the matter was set for trial, and
additional discovery would not have been feasible within the time
remaining for trial? (restatement of issues 4

of Appellant's

brief)
Although this rule [U.R.C.P. 15] tends to favor granting leave
to amend a pleading, the matter remains in the sound discretion of
the trial court; such discretion was not abused in refusing
plaintiff's requested leave to amend his complaint where amendments
would have delayed the trial and the substance of plaintiff's new
allegation was known a full year earlier. Westley v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch. f 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). See also,

Kelly v. Utah Power 7

Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987); Kleinert v, Kimball Elevator
Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993).

5.

Did the trial court err in finding at trial that the purchase

contract was entered into on March 13,1991, was agreed upon as to
amount to be paid, that it was Defendant Wayne Sommer who requested
title be in his father's name, and in denying defendant's claim of
"credits" where no evidence was offered as to the specifics of the
alleged credits? ( Restatement of appellant's issues 6 & 8).
4

A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P. 2d 1242, 1286
(Utah 1993); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d
1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). If viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's determination, a factual
finding is based on sufficient evidence, the finding is not clearly
erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 p.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994).
This standard of review carries with it the reguirement that
the Appellant marshall the evidence, see, Wade v. Stangel, 869 P.2d
9, 12 (Utah App. 1994); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991), which in this case has not been
done. Rather, Appellant has merely made assumptions from the record
as to its interpretations of the facts, omitting inconsistent
evidence adduced at trial, and left the burden to the Appellee to
marshall the evidence, see, e.g. Onieda/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage
and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994)(appellant
merely presented carefully selected facts favorable to its position
rather than properly marshalling the evidence); Robb v. Anderton,
863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993). Because Appellant failed to
marshall the evidence in support of challenged findings, findings
were upheld. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989). The same standard should apply in this case.1

1

Appellant also failed to cite to the record where each of its issues were preserved for
appeal or make a statement as to why issues not preserved should be heard as required in
U.R. A.P. Rule 24 (a)(5)(A) and(B). This burden also should not be shifted to the Appellee.
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case primarily involves conflicting claims of lien in and

to a 1981 Ford diesel dump truck. Plaintiff Ted Sommer is a used
equipment dealer, in business some 30 years or so prior to the
action, dba Sommer's Equipment and Sommer's Auto Wrecking (he has
several equipment yards). Defendant Wayne Sommer purchased the
subject vehicle in the spring of 1991 for some $9,000.00, plus tax
and license, $1,000.00 down, balance to be paid in monthly payments
with Plaintiff retaining a lien in the vehicle as security for the
balance. Wayne Sommer had done piece work for the Plaintiff, Ted
Sommer, and was a distant relative, known to all employees at the
yard.
Wayne Sommer asked title be placed in his father's name, Jack
W. Sommer, not inconsistent with prior vehicle purchases by both
Wayne and Jack. (Jack Sommer is the Plaintiff's cousin, also well
known to employees at the yard).
Wayne Sommer took the truck, used it for a year or so without
making payments, allegedly loaned it out to someone who burned up
the engine. Wayne Sommer then, in the fall of 1993, engaged
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc. to replace the engine, with an
original

bid of

$7,000.00, but ultimately

the bill exceeded

$10,400.00, plus storage. Wayne didn't pay the bill, Transmission
Tech Inc. proceeded to attempt foreclosure of its lien, and after
receipt of certified notice of proposed mechanics sale, Plaintiff
commenced this action seeking to have its lien declared superior to
6

that of Transmission Tech Inc.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December 16, 1993,

with an amended complaint filed December 30, 1993, alleging that
the Plaintiff had in March, 1991, sold Defendant Wayne Sommer a
1981 Ford Diesel Truck, total sales price of $9,761.00, with
$1,000.00 down payment having been received, balance to be paid on
monthly installments, none of which had been paid. (R. 1-17).
Plaintiff further acknowledged that at the request of Wayne Sommer,
title had been placed in his father's name, Jack W. Sommer, but
that a lien had been reserved by Plaintiff/Seller, Ted Sommer. (R.
2,6).

The

amended

Transmission Tech

complaint

further

advised

that

Defendant

Inc., at request of Defendant Wayne Sommer and

without notice to the Plaintiff, effected certain repairs to the
subject vehicle, claiming some $10,400.00 therefor, and asserting
a lien in the vehicle and right to sell to satisfy the lien.(R. 7,
12-15). Plaintiff sought from the Court, inter alia,

a determination

that the seller's title retaining lien was prior to that of
Defendant Transmission Tech Inc.,(hereinafter "Trans Tech"), a
judgment as to the balance due from Defendant Wayne Sommer and
authority to recover and sell the truck for satisfaction of the
liens (to the extent of any proceeds therefrom).
Defendant Jack Sommer filed a notice claiming no monetary
interest in the subject truck. (R. 20). Thereafter, Defendants Jack
and Wayne Sommer filed an Answer (the answer purports
all "Defendants", but it was

to represent

known to Plaintiff at this time that
7

Trans Tech was not being represented by Mr. Peezley), admitting the
contract, the sales price and down payment, that monthly payments
were to be made, and

that defendant Wayne Sommer had possession

and use of the vehicle since the date of sale, and denying the
remaining allegations. (R. 40-41).
Defendant

Trans

Tech

filed

an

Answer,

Crossclaim

and

Counterclaim January 24, 1994, wherein it plead for declaratory
relief as to the priority of its claimed repairman's lien, whether
it had rights against the title owner, Jack Sommer, method and
manner of sale, etc. Trans Tech further plead an action against
Wayne Sommer for the cost of the repairs. (R. 31-37).
Plaintiff filed his reply agreeing that declaratory relief was
needed by the parties and discovery was commenced.
The case was originally assigned to Judge Fuchs, during which
time discovery was had by both Plaintiff and Trans Tech. Attorney
Peezly withdrew as counsel for Wayne and Jack Sommer, (R. 92),
Ralph Marsh appeared on behalf of Jack Sommer, (R. 67), and Ross
Kinney was associated with attorney Lybbert on behalf of Trans Tech
(R. 94-95).Plaintiff filed his Motion and memorandum in support of
Summary Judgment against Defendant Trans Tech on the issue of
priority of lien on July 13, 1994 (R.105-161). By July 21, 1994 the
case had been assigned to Judge Pueler. (R. 250-251).
An affidavit had been filed in July, 1994 by Trans Tech in
response to the motion for Summary Judgment, in which it argued in
part that the motion was premature, some discovery having not yet
been received. (R.

165-281). Then, on August 10, 1994, Defendant
8

Trans Tech filed its opposing memorandum. (R. 265-286). Ironically,
despite having argued the motion was premature, Defendant Trans
Tech then filed the notice of readiness for decision on Plaintiff's
summary judgment motion. (R. 339)
A pretrial conference was held August 31, 1994, (R. 264),
wherein discovery cut off dates were set, and

a trial date of

somewhere between the 12-22 of December was proposed to coordinate
with Mr. Kinney's schedule. (R. 96, 291). On November 8th, 19 94,
notice of trial was sent out by counsel for Trans Tech, trial date
to be December 21, 1994. Then, on November 21, 1994, Defendant
Trans Tech filed its Motion to Amend the Pleading, setting forth
additional cross claims and counterclaims, and filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment, and memorandum in support, arguing its new
"fraudulent conspiracy" theory. (R. 390-502,524-616). Additional
affidavits were filed, and memoranda were filed, and the matter was
set for hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment and the
motion to amend on December 12, 1994.(R. 503).
The Court, Hon. Sandra Pueler, ruled at the summary judgment
hearing on December 12, 1994 and denied Defendant Trans Tech's
Motion to Amend the Pleading, granted certain motions to compel
responses

to discovery against Wayne Sommer, and took under

advisement the motions for summary judgment, both parties having
just filed additional memoranda. (R. 753-755). On December 16, 1994
Judge Pueler entered her memorandum decision

granting Plaintiff's

motion and denying defendant Trans Tech's motion for summary
judgment, specifically

ruling

that the

9

fraud

defense/offense

claimed by Trans Tech was inapplicable, stating "Although he [Wayne
Sommer] placed the vehicle in his father's name, he made no
material

representation

on

which

Trans

Tech

relied

to

its

detriment", (R. 748-750), Issues as to the exact amount owed on
each lien by Defendant Wayne Sommer were reserved for trail on the
merits of each claim, id.
Trial was held on December 21, 1994, during which Defendant
Trans Tech sought throughout to rehear the summary judgment motion.
(See. R. 879-881, 966-974). Plaintiff opposed the oral motion to
reconsider, in part because he had called down witnesses who would
have critical import on the issue already decided at summary
judgment (R. 885-86, 907, 922, 936, 944, 974-976, etc.). The Court
denied at trial Trans Tech's motion to reconsider the summary
judgment ruling. (R. 978-979)
After trial, the Court entered its memorandum decision on
February 3, 1995, finding in favor of the Plaintiff for the full
amount of its principal claimed, denying prejudgment interest
(except from the date of the complaint), and awarding a portion of
the attorney's fees.

Trans Tech was awarded against Wayne Sommer

the full value of the claimed repairs, interest, and storage fees.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered February 23,
1995, the same date judgment was entered.(R. 850-859). This appeal
followed by Trans Tech's notice of appeal having been filed March
20, 1995.

10

C. Undisputed facts in the record as of the cross motions for
summary judgment.
1.

On or about March, 1991, Plaintiff (Appellee herein) sold to
Defendant Wayne Sommer the following vehicle:
1981 Ford, Model MHVF80, body type-CC
8 Cylinder, Diesel, VIN-1FDXK84NXBVJ02644
The sale was for $9,761.00 (including $575.00 tax, $86.00
license and title fees), for $1,000.00 down and balance in
monthly payments. (Amend. Complaint R. 6, Verified by Aff. of
Ted Sommer,R. 378-79; Admitted by Wayne and Jack Sommer in
Answer, R. 40; Ted Sommer Aff. R. 625-627).

2.

Defendant Wayne Sommer caused title to be issued in the name
of his father Jack W. Sommer, with seller as lien holder.
(Aff. of Ted Sommer, R. 625-627; Submission of Documents,
Title R. 644, verified by T. Sommer 637-638).

3.

It is common practice to purchase a vehicle and title it in
another or relative's names, e.g. fathers buying for sons and
daughters, brothers buying trucks for brothers for whom they
work with, and children purchasing vehicles for their elderly
parents, and such a request would not have aroused suspicion
of Plaintiff's employees. (R.626-627). In fact, Wayne had
previously bought vehicles, one which was placed in his
father's name (with Jack then present), and a dump truck
similar to the one at issue which had been titled to a
partnership. (R. 625-627).

4.

Wayne Sommer signed his own name to the purchase agreement (R.

11

62 6) and to the Dealer Registration Record, both reflecting
Jack W. Sommer to be the titled owner, and Wally Anderson
(deceased by the time of the suit) notarized the signature of
Wayne Sommer to the dealer registration record.(R. 363-365).
Wayne had previously worked for the Plaintiff and was known to
him and his employees. (R. 625-627). The purchase agreement
signed by Wayne Sommer

provided for retention of title as a

lien and for attorney's fees in the event of default. (R.637641, 645-646).
Trans Tech was contacted by Defendant Wayne Sommer for repairs
completed in October, 1992 [sic]( should be 1993, R. 1037),
original estimate of $7,000.00, but eventual invoice in the
amount of $10, 432.28. (Trans Tech answer, R. 32). Plaintiff
first learned of the repairs only after the same had been
completed. (R. 626).
Jack Sommer had admitted receiving notice of the registration
of the truck shortly after the sale, but that it was a year or
so later before he asked to get off the title. (R. 626).
Nothing in the record shows that Trans Tech ever checked as to
who was the registered owner, whether or not there was any
liens on the title, or that Plaintiff

in any way ever

communicated anything to Trans Tech or its employees prior to
the repairs having been completed. Trans Tech's sole contact
was with Wayne Sommer. (R. 32).

12

Disputed facts found at trial by the Court.

At trial it was disputed whether or not the contract was
entered into on March 13, 1991 as it recites, or was done on
March 1, 1991 and made in blank as claimed by Defendant Wayne
Sommer. The Court found the contract was entered into on March
13, 1991 in the findings. (R. 831). Testimony in support of
this finding includes that of Dale Mickelson, the sales agent
of the Plaintiff who handled the subject transaction. (R. 890,
894-901, Exhibit P-2 admitted in evidence, 918, 920, 921,).
Appellant ignores this testimony in his claim that it was
"undisputed facts established by trail testimony" that the
contract must have been entered into on March 1, 1991 because
that is the day Wayne Sommer alleges the safety inspection was
done. First, testimony established that Wayne Sommer "tried
out" the vehicle sometime prior to sale, and safety inspection
may have been done then. (R. 890). Second, several witnesses
cast doubt on the credibility of Wayne Sommer, affirmatively
stating he had not been honest with them (R. 942, T. Sommer),
including Trans Tech's owner, Dave Strubble (R. 1067). Third,
Plaintiff objected at trial to the admission of the inspection
certificate inasmuch as the document was hearsay, having been
prepared

by

a

person

not

in

court

subject

to cross-

examination, and specifically objected to having the document
admitted

to establish any date, Wayne Sommer being unable to

verify same.(R. 114-115). The document was only received for
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limited purposes, and the trial Judge stated she would weigh
in the hearsay factor into consideration of Wayne Sommer's
testimony
throughout

on

the

issue.(R.

114-115).(Appellant

suggests

its brief that this fact is "undisputed", a

misstatement of the record).
9.

There was a dispute over the balance owed by Wayne Sommer to
Ted Sommer. (R. 906, 932, 1011-1012). The Court found in favor
of Plaintiff on this issue. (R. 851).

10.

Contrary to the statement made in Appellant's brief that Wayne
Sommer never got a copy of the purchase agreement, (Applt.
Brief, p.16 ), Wayne Sommer acknowledged the possibility that
he received it and stuck it in the glove box and never looked
at

it again

(R.990,

1009).

Dale Mickelson, Plaintiff's

employee, attested that a copy, filled in, was given to Wayne
Sommer at the time of sale, although he couldn't remember
exactly. (R. 901).^
11.

There was great dispute over who requested title to the truck
be placed in Jack Sommer's name. Dale Mickelson said it was
Wayne Sommer, (R. 903) that such transactions have been done
many times before. (R. 904). Dale knew who Jack Sommer was in
relation to Wayne Sommer. (R. 904). Wayne was living at his
father's house at the time of the truck purchase. (R. 990).
There was nothing unusual about the request. (R. 904). There
was no reason for Mr. Mickelson to put title in Jack Sommer's

2

This witness, Dale Mickelson, has deceased subsequent to trial.
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name unless requested to do so by Wayne. (R. 1095). Wayne
Sommer stated he did not ask title be placed in his father's
name on this vehicle, claiming the contract was in blank when
he signed it. (R. 985). However, Wayne acknowledged other
vehicles being purchased by or for him and titled in other
names, one being done by his father, and titled in Jack
Sommer's name. (R. 135). Wayne changed his testimony as to
whether or not he told Dale Mickelson to put the truck in his
fathers name. (R. 1014-1015). The Court found that it was
Wayne Sommer who placed title in his father's name. (R. 852).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The granting of summary

judgment to Plaintiff was well

supported by both the factual record and the law at the time of
entry and nothing at trial would have swayed the Court to rule
otherwise. It was known from the onset that Wayne Sommer requested
the vehicle be titled in the name of his father, Jack W. Sommer and
that a lien was reserved by the seller, Appellee herein. The issue
to be decided at summary judgment was who had priority of lien in
the vehicle, the seller's lien appearing on title or that of a
subsequently arising repairman. Though Trans Tech's motion to amend
the

pleading

to

include

fraud

was

not

granted,

the

Court

specifically considered and ruled against the Defendant Trans Tech
as to that purported theory in her Memorandum Decision on Summary
15

Judgment, same having been voluminously briefed by said Defendant.
The statutes are clear on the iss.io and the Court was correct
as a matter of law in upholding the seller's priority. Throughout
this case the Appellant's tactic has been to scream "fraud",
"false" and "conspiracy" without attempting to show that the
elements of a fraud case are applicable to these facts. No
representation was made by Ted Sommer to Trans Tech, so there
simply is no communication upon which Trans Tech can say it
detrimentally relied. The status of title is immaterial since Trans
Tech did not search the record prior to repairing the vehicle. They
searched it afterwards, and came upon the seller's lien, but
whether title was in Jack's name or Wayne's name, the repairman is
still in second position, and thus the distinction is "immaterial"
for purposes of summary judgment. Wayne Sommer had possession of
the vehicle, which is all that is necessary to create a valid
mechanic's lien, irrespective of Jack's titled ownership.
Something more than mere characterizations of evidence and
events and repetitious use of the word fraud is necessary to make
out such a case. Rather, the facts must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that each element is met, and such was not nor
can not be made out under the facts of the present case.

2.

Under Utah law, Plaintiff/seller's retianed title lien is

valid where as here, said lien is disclosed on the title. While
there may not have been absolutely perfect conduct exercized by
Plaintiff's employees, it is, at most, mere irregularity and does
16

not warrant non-recognition of the lien. The summary judgment was
warranted on the state of the record then existing as a matter of
law.

3.

Denial of the motion to reconsider summary judgment was

appropriate because of unfair surprise to the Plaintiff, and
because Trans Tech was not proffering additional facts for the
summary judgment record by way of affidavit or proffer of counsel,
but rather they wanted a trial on the decided issues to see what
evidence they might come up with if the witnesses were examined as
to such potential issues. In short, having lost at summary judgment
they wanted authority form the Court to engage in a fishing
expedition into the facts to see what, if anything, they could turn
up which might change the Court's decision. Such a procedure would
make a mockery of summary judgments and destroy the very purpose of
such motions, i.e. to save time and expense by reducing the issues.

4.

Denial of the Motion to amend the pleading was not an abuse of

discretion, same having been filed shortly before trial, allowing
amendment would certainly have required postponement of trial, and
the essential facts were known from the onset of the case. Though
Trans Tech attempted to argue this was a new "fact based" defense,
it was in reality just a new theory of the case, and was argued
below that it was a forgery of Jack's name to the registration
record, which theory was not supported by facts then in evidence
(or subsequently determined at trial).
17

5.

The factual findings at trial were well supported by the

evidence,

although

authority

cited,

disputed.

to

treat

Appellant's

the

Court's

attempts,

factual

without

findings

as

reviewable under a de novo standard is wholly contrary to Utah law.
By applying the proper standard of review to the challenges
raised, the judgment of the Court below should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

1.

The Circuit Court did not err in granting a motor vehicle

seller's

motion for summary judgment on the issue of a seller's

title retaining lien having priority over a subsequent mechanic's
lien where the mechanic/lienholder sought to amend its pleading and
raise new issues not factually supported by the record, which
motion was heard concurrent with the summary judgment motions only
nine days prior to trial.

The issue before the Court below on cross motions for summary
judgment was the priority of lien claims to a motor vehicle (1981
dump truck) of the vehicle seller with lien appearing on title vis
a vis a subsequently arising repairman's lien. The original brief
filed in July, 1994, by Plaintiff made it clear that Utah statutes
and administrative rules of the Department of Motor Vehicles gave
priority to the lien on title. Trans Tech's first response was that
discovery

was

not

complete,

and
18

Plaintiff,

apparently

in

recognition of this claim, filed no additional papers on the motion
for some two months(
motion

for

See R.341-42).

decision

in

Trans Tech itself

late October,

submitted

1994, having

the

received

discovery responses from everyone except Wayne Sommer (who had also
not responded to Plaintiff's discovery) and then in mid November
filed its motion to amend, followed shortly thereafter by its
motion for summary judgment on the theory that Jack Sommerfs name
had been forged to the Dealer registration certificate and that was
fraud.
There was nothing in the record showing Wayne Sommer to have
signed his father's name. Rather the record showed Wayne Sommer
signed his own name and it was Wayne Sommer's name that was
notarized (and known to the employees of Plaintiff).

(R. 363-365).

This information was submitted into the record October 25, 1994, by
Plaintiff, but was essentially disclosed to Trans Tech in response
to discovery served in June, 1994, and placed in the record by
Trans Tech itself, (R. 228-253; See also submission of documents,
R. 346-365, verified by Dale Mickelson 310-330).
Although Trans Tech claims in this appeal "newly discovered
evidence" justifying their late raising of the fraud issue, it was
plainly disclosed in the Complaint itself that Wayne Sommer bought

3

Wayne Sommer personally appeared at the summary judgment hearing on December 12,
1994, and acknowledged in open court that he signed his own name to the documents; At that
time he made no claim that the purchase agreement was blank when he signed it, though the
suggestion was raised at trial by Mr. Kinney's examination of Wayne Sommer. Appellant chose
not to have the summary judgment hearing transcribed, and the rules appear to place the burden
of making sure the record is complete on the appellant. U.R.A.P. 11 (e) (2).
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the truck and for reasons of his own requested title be placed in
his father's name. The only thing that was "new" was that Trans
Tech, having deduced from Plaintiff's memorandum that it was in
second position, needed to somehow void the lien. The new legal
theory arose not from the facts, but from necessity, i.e. fraud
claims

appeared

to be the way to avoid

the consequence of

Plaintiff's prior lien.
The trial court could have, from mere lateness of the raising
of the issue alone, completely discarded the question. She did not.
In her memorandum decision on summary judgment, she specifically
ruled

"Pursuant

to

U.C.A.

41-la-601

through

604, plaintiff

perfected its security interest in the subject vehicle. There is no
evidence

of any

fraud occurring

in the transaction, as the

undisputed facts show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the
purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who signed his
name to the purchase documents. Although he placed the vehicle in
his father's name, he made no material representation on which
Transmission Tech relied to its detriment." (R. 749).
Thus, the court below did consider the fraud argument, at
least for defensive purposes and concluded it was without merit.
This Court should concur. To establish a fraud claim, a party must
establish (1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a)
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5)
for the purpose of inducing the other to act upon it; (6) that the
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other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9)
to his injury and damage. Andalex Rescourses, Inc. v. Meyers, 871
P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994) (citing to Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1980)).
Appellant has not in its opening brief to this Court, nor in
its brief to the court below, nor in its proposed amendment to its
answer and counterclaim, ever made even a feeble attempt to show
how each element is satisfied under the facts of this case. Rather,
the strategy appears to be to shout repetitiously the words "fraud"
and "false", hoping somehow to make out a case without addressing
the elements thereof. Appellee argued below that the elements of a
fraud case are simply missing in this case.
First, the record is undisputed that neither Ted Sommer nor
his employees ever made any communication to Trans Tech prior to
Trans Tech having completed its repairs to the truck (in fact they
only learned of the repairs sometime later when Trans Tech called
them trying to collect on its bill, R.626). Retention of a lien for
the purchase money of a vehicle is no basis for liability. U.C.A.
§ 70A-9-317 states:
The mere existence of a security interest or authority
given to the debtor to dispose of or use collateral does
not impose contract or tort liability upon the secured
party for the debtor's acts or omissions.
Trans Tech's own answer confirms it was induced to do the repairs
by Wayne Sommer, not Plaintiff.
It is true that Wally Anderson, part time bookkeeper of
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Plaintiff, notarized the signature of Wayne Sommer to the owner
affidavit on the dealer registration certificate, and typed in the
information to the form. It is also true that the form says each
named owner must sign and that Jack Sommer did not sign that form.
However, the

record

also

reveals

that

it is not an

uncommon

practice in vehicle sales that one member of a family signs and has
vehicles titled in another. (R. 626-27). The UCC contemplated such
scenarios. U.C.A.

§70A-9-112 states:

Where Collateral Is Not Owned By Debtor
Unless otherwise agreed, when a secured party knows
that collateral is owned by a person who is not the
debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to
receive from the secured party any surplus under Section
9-502(2) or under 9-504(1), and is not liable for the
debt or for any deficiency after resale, and he has the
same rights as the debtor
(a) to receive statements under Section 9-208;
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a
secured
part's
proposal
to
retain
the
collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness
under Section 9-505;
(c) to redeem the collateral under Section 9506;
(d)to obtain injunctive relief....
(e) to recover losses caused to him..••
In short the statute sets out a comprehensive plan for dealing
with just this scenario. Debtor Wayne Sommer owes the debt. Owner
Jack

Sommer

is not liable for the debt, gets any

surplus on

repossession and sale, but is not liable for any deficiency. Both
owner and debtor are entitled to notices and may object to any plan
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, or may sue in
court. Were it not for such a comprehensive scheme, creditors would
be reluctant to sell to debtors who wanted to buy collateral to
give as gifts or use it in their corporations. Such is not the case
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however. When a seller, as here, knows that the item will belong to
someone other than the debtor, he takes on a small additional
burden, such as notices and duty to account after repossession and
sale, but the UCC doesn't void his purchase money lien.
If, as Trans Tech appears to argue herein, all liens are void
per-se where this dealer registration form was not signed by the
titled owner, there must be a lot of invalid liens in the state of
Utah. Parents routinely buy vehicles for children, sometimes as
surprise gifts deliberately not wanting them to know of the
purchase until a later time (birthday, graduation, etc.) and,
unless they have the cash on hand, the debt/lien remains with the
parents though the car is for the child. Family members in business
together often purchase vehicles, titling same for various reasons
in one or another's name. Finally, in the husband and wife
scenario, titles are routinely placed in both names whether or not
both are present to sign the registration certificate.
In this case, it is difficult to read Wayne Sommer's name. But
there

is

no

evidence

in

the

record

that

any

registration

certificate has ever been rejected and sent back by the Department
of Motor Vehicles for want of a family member's signature thereon.
The statement on the form that all owners must sign is just that,
an instruction on a form, not a statute, not a regulation or a
legislative enactment. Its an instruction on a form.
The U.C.C. recognizes that trade usage and course of dealing
is admissible evidence. U.C.A. §70A-l-205. Custom in the trade
routinely deviates from the form instructions with respect to
23

family/business members. Jack and Wayne Sommer had previously
bought vehicles from Ted Sommer. One, bought for Wayne was titled
in Jack's name, at request of Jack. Others Wayne has routinely
titled in business partnerships or others names. There is nothing
"false" or reckless with respect to Plaintiff's employees in this
case
There is no evidence Plaintiff intended to induce Trans Tech
to do anything. Trans Tech wasn't even in the picture at the time
of the sale. Their repairs were two (2) years later. How could Ted
Sommer have intended to induce them?
Trans Tech offered no proof, either at summary judgment or at
trial that anyone, not even Wayne Sommer made any representation as
to title, liens, registration, or other legal ownership prior to
the repairs. Trans Tech offered no proof it searched the motor
vehicle records, title records or otherwise prior to doing the
repairs, so how was it induced to act?
Finally,

what

is

the

damage

caused

by

the

alleged

misrepresentation? Whether or not the vehicle was titled in the
name of Jack W. Sommer, or Wayne Sommer, is irrelevant to a
repairman's lien. The repairman's lien arises from the possessory
use of the vehicle brought into the shop. U.C.A. §38-2-3 provides:
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow
labor upon, any article of personal property at the
request of the owner or other person entitled to
possession thereof shall have a lien upon such article
for the reasonable value of the labor performed and the
materials furnished and used in the making of such
article or in the altering or repairing the same, and may
retain possession thereof the amount so due is paid;
provided such lien and right to possession shall be
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subject and subordinate to the rights and interests of
any secured parties in such personal property unless the
secured party has requested such person to make, alter or
repair or bestow labor upon such property. [emphasis
added]
Thus, Trans Tech is entitled to a second position lien only.
Their second position lien is valid irrespective of whether or not
Jack Sommer or Wayne Sommer is the titled owner, but their lien is
inferior to that of the Plaintiff because Plaintiff never got paid
for the truck and retained his lien on the title. It is not the
status of title which injures them; It is the fact that they,
without checking for liens, put $10,400.00 into a truck not worth
that much.4
In short, there are no facts which would support a claim for
fraud. The proposed amended complaint does not even plead a case
for such, and fraud must be plead specifically. Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P.
Leave to file an amended complaint should be denied when the moving
party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or
futile. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, supra at 1046; see also,
Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Utah 1992).
Further, fraud requires proof by a clear and convincing
evidence standard, a matter which the trial court was obligated to
consider

on the cross motions for summary

judgment. Andalex

Resources, Inc., v. Meyers, supra at 1046-47; Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986)(a party must make a sufficient showing to establish the
4

Public auction held subsequent to the filing of this appeal in satisfaction of Plaintiffs lien
brought only a $7,000.00 high bid for the truck, less costs of sale and preparation costs for sale.
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existence of all essential elements of a claim on which that part
would bear the burden of proof at trial); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d

202

(1986)(a party must prove with clear and convincing evidence at the
summary judgment stage if that is the burden required at trial);

see also,
(Utah

Robinson vf mtermountcun Health cgre, 740 p.2d 262, 264
App.

1987);

Applied

Genetics,

Int'l,

Inc. ,

v,

First

Affiliated Securities, Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.1990).
Trans Tech failed to make a showing of even a scintilla of
evidence on several of the elements of its proposed fraud case,
much less sustain its burden by clear and convincing evidence. It
would

have

been

legal

error

for

the

Court

to

have

denied

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment when presented with a fraud
defense as deficient as the one before it and the Court below was
obligated to deny the motion to amend the pleading where they were
deficient on their face.
Cases cited by Appellant are not on point. The only case even
remotely relevant is Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P. 2d
951 (Utah App. 1993), wherein in anticipation of financing by a
bank for buyer to purchase a trailer, vehicle dealer Lake Philgas
had purchaser Bennet execute a security agreement and a dealer
registration certificate showing dealer as a lienholder on title
and Bennet as owner. Bank financing fell through, and Bennett
retained possession of the trailer under a lease agreement with
dealer. Later, judgment creditor Valley Bank attempted execution on
the trailer, after learning from dealer about the failed financing.
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The Court ruled that despite title designation of Bennet as owner,
judgment creditor could not execute on trailer inasmuch as it had
learned prior to execution that Bennett was a mere lessee. In other
words, while it was true that the security agreement failed for
want of eventual consummation of sale, the Court recognized the
realities of ownership and interests despite title.
In this case, despite whomever Wayne Sommer designated as
title owner, Ted Sommer reserved a security interest on that title,
giving clear notice to the world at the time Trans Tech commenced
work of Sommer1s claimed interest. Trans Tech certainly knew of the
lien by the time it attempted repairman's foreclosure and the
realities of the case support Appellee's lien.
The other cases cited are not apropos.5 In Automobile Accept.
Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Cr. Corp., 139 A.2d 683 (Md. App. 1958)
there

is unquestioned

fraud

by the dealer

who induced the

purchaser to sign multiple conditional sale contracts, sold each
contract

to separate

financiers, not disclosing

the adverse

security interests. That presents a case of dealer fraud, obviously
voiding the lien. Misrepresentation of false fact, inducement,
reliance, injury, all the elements clearly and convincingly arising
from the facts. Dissault v. Evans, 201 P.2d 822 (Idaho 1953) and
Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 30 N.E. 2d 1002 (Ohio 1940) are
not situations involving a seller's title retaining lien, but
5

Appellant cites many times to Meyer v American General Corp. in its brief, see e.g.
pgsAl,42, but each time uses only supra as the citation. This counsel couldn.tfindthe actual
citation anywhere in its brief, not even in the table of authorities. Without a citation, it is difficult
to review the case and respond.
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rather

are situations where a partner or association member

attempted, without any apparent or actual authority, to encumber
property that belonged to the partnership or association. In this
case, if Wayne Sommer had merely came into Plaintiff's yard with a
truck already titled to his father and attempted to grant a lien
therein to purchase a different truck, no question Jack Sommerfs
signature

would

have been

expressly

required

by

Plaintiff's

employees. The title itself would have required that. Here, on the
other hand, Plaintiff already had title, wouldn't release same
without payment or lien, and whose name the purchaser wished title
be placed in was a mere accommodation to the customer, as title
would be returned to Plaintiff from Motor Vehicles so long as

the

lien remained unpaid. As shown earlier, by virtue of past dealings
and familial relations, Wayne had apparent if not actual authority
to so request.
Drettmann v. Marchand, 337 Mich. 1, 59 N.W. 2d 56 (1953) is a
case where a claimed lienholder to a motor vehicle had not filed
his interest of record on the title and lost vis a vis an auction
company who sold the vehicles unaware of Plaintiff's interest.
Although there was fraud in the inducement by the dealer who took
the vehicles to the auction under promise to return and pay as soon
as same were sold, the basis for the decision was the lack of a
lien appearing on the title. It is difficult to understand how this
case supports the conclusion cited by the Appellant in his brief.
Appellant also complains the sale contract violated the
statute of frauds. First, this defense was not plead, either in its
28

original answer or in the proposed amended answer.

The statute of

frauds is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the
pleading else it is waived. Philips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876
(Utah 1983). Though argued in one of its briefs below, the issue
was not addressed by the trial court, and was not properly raised
for consideration thereby. See, e.g. State v. Mickelson, 848 P. 2d
677 (Utah App. 1992) (issue not framed by the pleading was not
preserved for consideration on appeal); see also,

Ong Intf1 (USA)) ,

Inc. v. llth Ave. Corp. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993).
Second, it is inapplicable to the case at bar. The operative
statute, U.C.A. §70A-2-201 provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
contract for sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or
by his authorized agent or broker* A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown
in such writing.
(2)
(3) a Contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable
(a)...
(b) if the part against whom enforcement is sought admits
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made,...
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted
(sec.2-606).
In the present case, both Jack W. Sommer and Wayne Sommer
admitted the contract to buy the truck in their answer, and
admitted that Wayne Sommer had received the truck. Trans Tech did
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not admit the contract in its answer, but it was not a party to the
contract, and admission by it was not necessary to satisfaction of
the statute of frauds.
Trans Tech further argues irregularities in Plaintiff's brief
as a grounds for reversal. It is ironical, inasmuch as Trans Tech
itself failed to comport with Rule 401 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration. Almost all of Trans Tech's briefs were over length,
without permission of the Court, and it too filed briefs as of the
day of hearing. Appellee's position is that the trial court went
out of its way to afford all parties adequate time, more than
adequate briefing opportunities, and a full hearing on their
respective claims, including numerous issues raised by Trans Tech
which not plead or properly at issue in the case. Neither Wayne
Sommer or Jack Sommer filed anything in opposition to the summary
judgment motions, yet the court deferred for trial issues as to
amount owed when such issues were raised only by the pleading. It
is difficult comprehend how more fair to all she could have been.
Further, Defendant made its own motion for summary judgment
essentially arguing the facts were clear. In fact, they were so
impressed by their own work, they filed a Rule 11 motion against
Plaintiff without even waiting for a ruling on summary judgment, a
brief replete with name calling and scandalous outrage. (R. 756766) .
There was no error in the granting of summary judgment on the
issue of lien priority under the circumstances of this case.
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2.

The Court, as a matter of law, properly ruled at summary

judgment that the title retaining lien of a motor vehicle seller
was valid and had priority despite title having been placed in the
buyer's fathers name, with seller's lien appearing thereon, where
the issues of unconscionability and estoppel were first raised only
after the ruling and same do not appear in the pleadings.

The Court reviewing a motion for summary judgment applies the
same standard as that of the court below, Briggs v. Holocomb, supra.
Appellant, in its opening brief, argues that the summary judgment
granted Plaintiff wasn't proper as because of issues of estoppel
and unconscionability.
First, as to the estoppel issue, that claim was never raised
below/ Issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally
not considered by Utah appellate courts. See, Ong Int'l (U.S.A.)r
Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., supra, (also cited in Appellant's brief);
Ashcroft y. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App.),cert,
den. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
Second, estoppel must be pleaded or it is waived. Matter of
Estate of Justheimf -824 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1991). Third, estoppel
is only present where words or conduct by one party leads another
to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. Perkins v.
Great-West Life Assur. Co.f 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). As has
6

Appellant avoids the burden imposed on it by U.R. A.P. Rule 24 by simply ignoring this
requirement throughout its brief.
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been pointed out supra,

in issue 1, Plaintiff/Appellant never

communicated anything to Trans Tech- Plaintiff has consistently
maintained its claim to a lien throughout. Trans Tech changed its
strategies and theories of the case both below, and again on this
appeal, but Plaintiff has remained steadfast.
Trans Tech was not induced to repair the vehicle by Appellant,
rather it was induced by Defendant Wayne Sommer. Appellant's injury
arises not from the actions of Ted Sommer, but from its own
inaction in failing to check the status of title and liens prior to
doing an alleged $10,400.00 in repairs to a seven or eight thousand
dollar

truck. A party claiming

estoppel

cannot rely on the

representations or acts if they are contrary to his knowledge of
truth or if he had means by which with reasonable diligence he
could have ascertained the truth. Perking v. Great-West Life Agsur.
Co., supra
In this case Trans Tech had only to pick up the phone. The
Department of Motor Vehicles is available regular business hours.
They had the truck, they knew the VIN number. They could have
requested a deposit from Wayne Sommer before extending such a great
sum on a 1981 Truck. They were in a position to avoid this matter.
Ted Sommer, having already sold the truck reserving a lien, had no
opportunity to know of the Trans Tech repairs until after it was
already done.
With respect to unconscionability, that too is not in the
pleadings or summary judgment arguments, and was not raised until
Trans Tech attempted to raise it at trial, with timely objection
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made by Appellee, which objection was sustained. (R. 68-70). The
contract was admitted by all the parties to it in the pleadings by
virtue of the Answer of Jack and Wayne Sommer. The terms were
admitted. The only disputes were balance remaining owed and whether
or not Wayne Sommer requested title be in Jack Sommerfs name
(authority to do so was not denied in the pleadings, just whether
or not that was what Wayne did).
The standards for a claim of unconscionability are well
addressed in Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranchf 706 P.2d
1028 (Utah 1985) and applying those tests it is apparent no claim
of

unconscionability

is

present.

Wayne

Sommer

was

not

underprivileged, unsophisticated or illiterate. The language of the
purchase agreement, while on the back of the form, is plain,
readable (at least on the original copies), without boilerplate and
the parties had negotiated several contracts before. In fact,
testimony shows that it was Wayne Sommer who had been taking
advantage of Plaintiff, and not the other way around.(R. 78).
Appellant again argues that the purchase agreement was blank
at the time that it was signed by Wayne Sommer (they have to
maintain this position otherwise Wayne Sommer is not being honest
when he says he didn't request it be titled in his father's name).
That argument was not raised at the summary judgment hearing.
Further, it is contrary to evidence introduced at trial. (R. 890,
894-901).

Second, Wayne Sommer was, essentially, attempting to

impeach his own pleadings because the contract had been admitted.
Finally, the Court concluded that the contract was entered
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into on March 13, 1991, and that Wayne Sommer was the one that
reguested title be placed in his father's name based on the
undisputed state of the record then before it, and found similarly
after trial against Wayne on the amount of the balance owing. As a
matter of law, the Court ruled on the record before it at the time
of the hearing on summary judgment, and on the issues then raised
in the pleadings and subseguently raised issues should not be
considered as a basis for second guessing the Court below,

3.

After granting summary judgment for a motor vehicle seller on

the on cross motions for declaratory judgment on issue of lien
priority vis a vis a

subsequent repairman's lien, the Court did

not err in refusing to reconsider at a trial on other issues, the
previously granted motion where, in reliance on the order of
summary

judgment, the prevailing

party

was

not prepared

to

relitigate the issues already decided by the motion.

There is no "motion for reconsideration" of a summary judgment
ruling provided for in the rules of civil procedure. Utah State
Employee's Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 462 P.2d 1,3
(1970); Tracy vf University pf Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah
1980);

But

see,

Watkiss v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d

1061

(Utah

1991)(motion treated as a motion for a new trial under Rule 59).
Second, assuming arguendo that the judge should have considered
it as a Rule 59 motion, such motion should have been accompanied
with affidavits or proffers as to "new " evidence to be considered.
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A review of this oral motion raised only at trial with no prior
notice shows that Trans Tech didn't know of any evidence not
already in the record, but were merely trying to use trial as a
"fishing expedition" in the hopes of finding such evidence,

cf.

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990) rev'd
on other

grounds,

827 P. 2d 212 (Utah 1992) (purpose of affidavits

under Rule 56(f) is to show court precisely what facts additional
discovery is expected to produce and how such facts are material to
the motion, not to allow "fishing expedition" in the hopes of
avoiding judgment).
Here, Trans Tech had adequate time to respond to the motion,
in fact almost six months. Trans Tech itself submitted Plaintiff's
motion for decision. Nothing more than simple dissatisfaction with
the ruling was proffered as a basis for the reconsideration.
Further, Plaintiff's counsel had already called down witnesses
critical to the fraud issues Trans Tech wanted to reconsider,
specifically the Department of Motor Vehicle investigators whom
Plaintiff would believed would testify as to the customary practice
of family members titling vehicles in one and another's name (R.
885) .
Here the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion. Allowing a party who is dissatisfied with a summary
judgment ruling to reopen the matter at a trial on other issues
defeats the purpose of summary judgments. Rule 56 is intended to
discover whether a controversy can be settled as a matter of law,
thereby saving both the court and litigants time trouble and
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expense of trial. See, e.g.

Rich v. McG^ern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah

1976).

4.

The court did not err in denying a motion to amend the

pleading to add additional counterclaims and cross claims for fraud
and conspiracy, where such claims had not been previously raised in
the pleading, where the substantive facts for the new theories were
available from the onset of the case, the motion was made only one
month before trial, made after the matter was set for trial, and
additional discovery would not have been feasible within the time
remaining for trial.

As was stated in jQeinert v. Kimball Elevator QQ., 854 P.2d
1025 (Utah App. 1993):
The decision to allow leave to amend a
complaint is discretionary with the trial
court. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365
(Utah 1984); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,
248 (Utah 1983). Utah Courts have focused on
three factors when deciding whether to grant a
motion to amend:(1) the timeliness of the
motion; (2) the justification given by the
movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting
prejudice to the responding party. Regional
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210,
1216 (Utah App.1989). In Westley v. Farmer's
lns? Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983),
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's refusal to grant leave to amend
because ,f[a]n amendment would certainly have
delayed the trial and the substance of
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full
year earlier when plaintiff discussed it in
his deposition."
Kljenert, supra at

1028.
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In the present case, the essential fact that Wayne Sommer
placed title in the name of his father was known from the onset of
the case, and acknowledged in discovery documents served in June,
1994. Delaying filing of the motion to amend until mid November,
19 94, was not excused and, inasmuch as hearing on the motion was
not had until December, 1994, would unquestionably have delayed
trial. The truck itself wasn't getting any more valuable with age
and thus delay would have been detrimental.
Trans Tech attempts to say it didn't have all discovery, but
doesn't point to any specific responses that would have been new to
the case.
Finally, its proposed amendment for fraud fails to state a
claim under Utah law, not being specifically plead and not having
the elements required to make out a fraud claim. Leave to file an
amended complaint should be denied when the moving party seeks to
assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or futile. Andalex
Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, supra at 1046.

5.

The trial court did not err in finding at trial that the

purchase contract was entered into on March 13,1991, was agreed
upon as to amount to be paid, that it was Defendant Wayne Sommer
who requested title be in his father's name, and in denying
Defendant's claim of "credits" where no evidence was offered as to
the specifics of the alleged credits.

Although Appellant maintains they are reviewable under a de-
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novo standard of review, without citation therefor, what is really
being attempted is to attack
court after trial on the amoun

:ain findings of fact made by the
^ssue, findings not material to the

summary judgment, then with Appellant's own findings different from
those found by the court, it attempts to argue material issues of
fact present at the summary judgment. These factual issues were
fully explored at trial, and although conflicting evidence was
submitted, the court found in favor of Plaintiff's version of the
facts. Unless these findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate
court must sustain them on appeal. Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurstf 846
P. 2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).Factual findings are clearly erroneous
if they are "not adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes

in

the

light most

favorable

to

the trial

court's

determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Dale Mickelson testified that at on March 13, 1991, the
purchase contact was signed by Wayne Sommer and the sale was
consummated. He testified that the purchase contract was filled in
at the time it was signed. (R. 890, 894-901, Exhibit P-2 admitted,
918, 920, 921). Trans Tech disagrees with this finding because it
was

attempting

unconscionability.

to

raise

They

rest

new
their

issues

at

conclusion

trial,
that

it

i.e.
was

undisputed that the contract was signed in blank on March 1, 1991
on the testimony of Wayne Sommer and the inspection certificate;
exhibit D-2. However, several witnesses agreed that Wayne Sommer
wasn't honest, including Trans Tech's owner, Dave Strubble.(R. 942;
1067). Third, exhibit D-2 was admitted over hearsay objection and
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due to lack of cross examination of the person who prepared it we
really can't be sure as to its

accuracy

or authenticity.

There was a dispute as to whether or not Wayne Sommer ever got
a copy of the purchase agreement. Appellant maintains that the
record

is

clear

that

he

didn't, but

Wayne

Sommer

himself

acknowledged he may have. (R. 990, 1009). Inasmuch as the contract
was admitted by his pleadings, this issue was irrelevant.
There was great dispute as to whether or not Wayne Sommer
requested title be in his father's name. Dale Mickelson attested he
had,(R. 903), and that there would be no other reason for so
titling the vehicle.(R. 1095). Wayne Sommer testified he did not,
but was inconsistent in his statements. (R. 1014-1015). The Court
had already found on summary judgment that Wayne Sommer made the
request, but ruled again at trial in favor of Plaintiff on the
issue.(R. 852).
Each

of

the

challenged

factual

findings

is

adequately

supported by evidence in the record and Appellant's conclusory
statements to the contrary, without even a superficial attempt to
marshall the evidence as required, does not change the facts as
found by the trial court.

CONCLUSION
The

summary

judgment

ruling

of

the

trial

court

below

concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff's purchase money lien
in the truck had priority over the repairman, Trans Tech, should be
affirmed.

The

rulings

denying
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Trans

Tech's

motion

for

reconsideration and motion to amend the pleadings were well within
the sound discretion of the tiial court and should be affirmed. The
factual findings are supported by adequate, if not the great
weight, of the evidence and the judgment entered below should be
affirmed.
The relief requested by trans tech is wholly inappropriate.
First, the priority of lien is essentially a moot question inasmuch
as the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff/seller was not appealed
by Defendants Wayne Sommer and Jack Sommer, and Appellant took no
steps either before the Circuit Court, or this Court, to stay
execution of the judgment. The truck having been sold at public
auction

in partial satisfaction of Plaintiff's judgment, the

repairman's lien is forever gone.
With respect to the claim for monetary damages, there was no
legally sufficient pleading below upon which a fraud case could be
premised, much less clear and convincing evidence to support such
claim.

For the reasons as set forth in this brief, the judgment of

the Circuit Court, Honorable Sandra

N. Pueler presiding, should be

affirmed.
DATED THIS 16th day of July, 1995.

Steven A. Wuthrich
Attorney for the Appellee, Ted Sommer
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF
Exhibit P-l Utah Certifier * of Title, Salt Lake City Corp. to
Plaintiff Ted -jiraner, admitted in evidence R. 930 . 43
Exhibit P-2 Vehicle Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement,
Admitted in evidence R. 901
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Exhibit P-3 Utah Certificate of Title showing Ted Sommer
as lienholder, admitted in evidence R. 906
Exhibit P-4 Trans Tech certified notice

47
49

Exhibit P-5 Computer calculation of principal and interest owed
by Wayne Sommer
53
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of the d^airi
NOvV*R?iArjr!?3 E/PnESSEQQ* IMPLIED. ARE MADE OR W'LL BE DEEMEDTO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THt
DFALER OR T-*. M^>4U-ACTU^Efl O* THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNlSHEC
MrHEUNDE*. E>CSP"nr*'s ONLY THE CURRENT PRtNTEC WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE
CH/xSSIo.VVHiCH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHIOUViL*.
Be: DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME Or DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS. SUCH vVAPRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY iN LiEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
INCLUDING. BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY Or MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
-ARTICULAR PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES
AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS
NO WARRANTIES. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. ARE MADE BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FUfiMSMEO HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE
DEALER FOR SUCH U5Z.0 MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN
WRITING. IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.
'••• n case rhe vehicle c o v e r t fcy this agreement *<> a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as lo
the extent such vehicle has- Peen used, regardless of the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used vehicle.
f>. Ui m« event thar a becomes necessary tor Dealer to enforce any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, purchaser
zqwes to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs
3

Th»s agreements Non-Transferable

10

LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOP BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IK
THIS AGREEMENT

11

PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is IB years of age or older.

12

Title to the vehicle is to remain vested m the Dealer until purchase price is paid in full; purchaser grants rodealer tsocurir
interest »n the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full*

*:*

N:> agreement, verbal or otnervme. not contained in this agreement will be recognized...

iwtfnn

C W W f l . U > ,

JJI^flTW

&HICLE "-• •"••'

TITLE l u e o i o e i r : ; ; ^ / . : . '
. :,.
UTE" ISSUED o « / o u / 9 i v':>^^-.>K!'..-?I^^-J.\^''.;••::,..,•
ICEHSE•;••' 962UCN A
<v\^
0929195021 '.':•'• v
•"a 6 <ie'
^>s. .-"' > \ ,

: .'?

M ^^**>&
.'State Tax Commissi' .
$*! Motor Vehicle Division
1095 Motor A,.;
Salt L i k e City, titer, c - ' •

MAILING AOORESS"

V v ^ t SOMERS 'AUTO WRECKING':
J ; ' : - I 6«7 W 33*00 SOUTH ; , ^
* ) ^ t ; " S L C ' U T J 8«119 / " ; " ^
i-'",-f"^' - j '"' • ' • * • - ' . ' / ' ' i

Wl§j-;

•/

' •". .

> ' " ' ' VEHICLE IDENTIFICAnoN

w •:/•<••••: •"';,./.. . '^:;v:/•; **£">/#*>\)?&-%\

IN-lFDIK8«NXBVJ026tJt» V I • / ' * , i ^
EAR-81
HAKE-FORD
MODEL~flHVF80
YLr! 8'; FUEL-D^
v M--^:v- W^-" •""•

..:?. > .-t-'
NAME AM? ADORESS Of.•VEHICLE OWNER(S)

/5'OHIiM JACK..^H,V;|/#t^ V ; £ W f e r ; ; • G ; v ^ ^ i
' ^ % " 1 8 6 r DSONN LH , .
iAME -

=VV®*^:SS;UEN-HOLDER ; ^i7v5I#v' "//H •
^J^pSOMJBRS^ AUTO' ^ W R E C K I I S G ^ * / / !
47 w
WRESS;^ 6
3300 SOUTH ^ ^ ^ • v - '
u

i&i^tk^s Ltr fc-mMi^

LIENREUI'V^'-';

tSX3NATUREOF

UEN-HOLDER R&E$>JN'5 INTEREST

n T^B a 11 ? ••. \

^-,

THE "MOTOR VEHICLE/ DIVISION,'•'pursuant r to. the laws'of the^State^^^^
named above has been ^

and that this

vehicle is subject to the lien and encumbrance, rf]anyl herein set forth. r-L?'•/.'•: -:!.? $ ^ % ^
FORM Tt>127 REV.7/89 r .,-""••

"I"'—r^J

pernor,

Z::- 'f± 4 j f X < ^ K ^

ll^L^ ^

^ v / >-- - - ^

f

^

;

3..r"/^^i; ® ^ f e ^ /

3/r r-urii/HAOt:

FHtlF

OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE
For the Sates/Purchase pnce specked herein, I (we) the undersigned owner(s) hereby transfer,
convey and assign ail rights tttle and interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof to
the Nbw Owner named below and warrant the title to be free and deaf of all encumbrances,
VA^oolvod
except a lien in favor of the person identified below as New ben - Holder, if any
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER STATE THE MjLEAQE UPON J R A N S F ^ ^ ^ W N E R W
A VEHICLE
FAILURE TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALSE ^TEMENT^MAY RESULT IN FlNESjAjyfflffi IMPRISONMENT
UDOMETER READING

E$

-

EJy Owner/Authorized Agent
(Name must be prated)

Transfer or / Company Nome
(Name must be printed)

whose current address is

Streets.

-L

miles (no term..
-St.
CityJZVhereby certify that on the date of this statement the odometer reads the mileage here recorded, &n#3fcat,(o the best of m/
and belief this reflects the actual mileage for this vehicie, unless one of the following is checked
C ) Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer mechanical limits
(" ) Is NOT the actual mileage for this vehicle WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY
X , 19
,
Signature of Transferor in ink (must bo notarized)
Signature of Joint Transferor (must be notarized)

"Subscribed and sworn to this

day of

Notary
Seal

.,19.

Signature of Notary Public or M V Examiner
NEWiJEN-HOLOER (Name must befrfnfeft

NEW OWNER (Name must be printed)
NAME

NAME

ADDRESS.

ADDRESS.
-ST..

CHTY

,,

^ ^ ^ ~ _

crrY_

-ZJP_

.ZIP-

UEN RELEASE

K

Signature of Purchaser (New Owner)
Signature of Ueohoider Releasing Inters**

-iwsr

bete"
Rt-ASSIGNY,cHT OF TfTlf EY i (ANSPEROR

-ES/PURCHA£E P

FHP

OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE.
.For the Sales/Purchase price specified herein I (we) the undersigned owner(s) hereby transfer,
convey and assign all rights title and interest to the vehicle described on tte face hereof to
the New Owner named below and warrant the title to be free and clear of ail encumbrances,
except a lien in favor of the person identified below as New Lien-Holder, if any

An Wance For
TrcJeHn Vehicle

GE

~
Ct>-

$-

.J

FEDERAL AND STATE LAW REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER STATE THE MILEAGE UPON TRANSFER"OPJDVVNERSHIP OF A ' \ L ~
FAILURE TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALSE STATEMENT, MAY RESULT IN FINES AJjp/QR IMPRISONMENT
«* " O D O M E T E R READINU
Transferor / Company Name
(Name must be pnnted)

whose current address is

By Owner/Authorized Agent
(Name must be panted)

Street _

City.

_St„

m l e s (no tentrsy

.Zip.

herety certify that on the date of this statement the odometer reads the mileage here recorded and tha£to the ocst o my ^
and belief thisreflectsthe actual mteagefor this vehicle unless one of the following is checked
( »Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer mecbao»ca! limits
f , Is NOT the actual mileage for this vehicie WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY
*
19
5«gnature of Transferor m ink (must be notarized)
signature of Joint Transferor (must be notarized)

Subscribed and sworn to this

-

day of _

NEW OWNER (Name must be printed)

ADDRESS-

NAME
.ST_

Notary
Seat

Signature of Notary Public of M V Examiner """
NEW UEN-HOLDER (Name must beamed)

NAME

CITY

19.

.Z1P_

X.,
Signature of Purchaser (New Owner)

v

-

—

ADDRESSCITY

_$r~

.ZIFL

UTAH CODE ANN § 4 1 - 1 - 6 2 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON THE SALE^OR DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE

TRANS TECH, INC395 West 200 South
Clearfield, Utah 84015
PH: (801) 875-6976

-^

of 70

December 21, 1993

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Wayne Sommers
1788 East 5600 South
Holiday, UT 84121
Jack Sommers
1861 Delann Lane
Holiday, UT 84121
Sommers Auto Wrecking
647 West 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Enviro-West
4747 South Cherry Street
Midvale, UT 84121
Re:

Foreclosure of Lien Upon Truck
(See enclosed copy of Utah Registration Certificate)

Gentlemen:
Enclosed is a copy of a Service Order/Invoice which we sent
to Wayne Sommers via Certified mail, return receipt requested, on
November 8, 1993. He not only refused to claim this letter from
the post office, but has refused to pay anything on that bill
which became delinquent on November 1, 1993. Nor has any other
person or entity paid anything. I also have enclosed a copy of a
sheet which indicates the current balance due on this bill, after
adding in appropriate interest and storage charges, which if paid
in cash to Trans Tech within 7 days would be sufficient to redeem
the truck.
We have, of course, a lien under section 38-2-3, Utah
Stats., on the truck described in the Service Order/Invoice for
the full balance due on that bill for labor and services
performed on the truck, as well as interest and storage charges
which will be accruing on a daily basis hereafter, and our
"costs" (e.g. attorney's fees) in foreclosing our lien. See e.g.

Gunnison Valley Bk. v. Madsen, 685 P.2d 543 (Sup, Ct. Utah 1984)
(implied contract); Howard v. J.P. Poulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 127
Pac. 284 (1912); Westminister Inv. Co. v. McCurtain, 39 Utah 544,
118 Pac. 564 (1911) (held as a matter of law lien existed as a
result of implied contract). This lien is subject to enforcement
under §38-2-4, Utah Stats., and the truck may be sold to satisfy
the lien.
Accordingly, please take notice that we will be (1)
retaining possession of the truck at our premises unless and
until the total balance due on the enclosed bill is fully paid
and (2) foreclosing our lien and selling the truck on Saturday,
February 19, 1994, at a public sale to be held at our premises
commencing at 10:30 a.m.
We will be selling the truck to the
person or entity making the highest written offer therefor. The
offers to be considered by us must, however, call for immediate
payment via the offset of a valid lien (or liens) on the truck,
cash, bank cashier's check and/or personal check certified by a
bank. Trans Tech expects to make one or more offers. All such
offers must be made in writing to Trans Tech and received by me
at any time prior to 11:00 a.m. on February 19, 1994. Our
decision as to the offer which has been accepted and the person
or entity to whom Trans Tech will sell the truck, shall be made
and announced publicly by me on our premises no later than 11:15
a.m. on that day.
If any of you claim that you have a valid lien on this
truck, please so advise me in writing at your earliest
convenience and also state whether or not you claim that the lien
has priority over our lien. If you claim priority, please
explain in detail in writing all reasons why you make this claim
and also enclose fully legible copies of all documentation which
you claim establishes the validity, amount and/or priority of the
lien. Further please advise me in writing of (1) any persons or
entities that you know of that claim any interest in and/or any
lien on the truck and (2) any proposed additions, deletions
and/or modifications of any of our present arrangements for the
sale of the truck which you believe would be fairer, together
with a detailed explanation of the reasons why you believe that
they would fairer.
Please take notice that according to the information we have
been able to collect to date:
1.

The present registered owner of the truck is Jack W.
Sommer, 1861 Delann Lane, Holiday UT 84121;

2.

Sommers Auto Wrecking, which sold the truck to Jack W,
Sommer, claims a lien on the truck;

Please also take notice that (1) under section 38:2:4, Utah
Stats., subsection (b)(vii), "...the owner of the property
[truck] has a right to recover possession of the property [truck]
without instituting judicial proceedings by posting bond" and (2)

50

the mechanic is Dave Strebel whose business address and telephone
number is the same as Trans Tech's.
If any of you have any questions or desire to discuss
anything, please contact me at your earliest convenience.
Trans Tech, Inc.

by:

HjllLC
Pennie Strebel
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